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Abstract— Networking attacks embedded in spam emails are 
increasingly becoming numerous and sophisticated in nature. 
Hence this has given a growing need for spam email analysis to 
identify these attacks. The use of these intrusion detection 
systems has given rise to other two issues, 1) the presentation 
and understanding of large amounts of spam emails, 2) the 
user-assisted input and quantified adjustment during the 
analysis process. In this paper we introduce a new analytical 
model that uses two coefficient vectors: ‘density’ and ‘weight’ 
for the analysis of spam email viruses and attacks. We then use 
a visual clustering method to classify and display the spam 
emails. The visualization allows users to interactively select 
and scale down the scope of views for better understanding of 
different types of the spam email attacks. The experiment 
shows that this new model with the clustering visualization can 
be effectively used for network security analysis. 
Keywords- Spam email, network security analysis, clustered 
visualization, information visualization, network intrusion 
detection, DDoS attacks 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Spam email is a common type of the cyber nuisance. It 
not only wastes resources, but also poses serious security 
threats [1]. Spam emails can be divided into two types: those 
with the attachment and others without the attachment. The 
attachments are normally the executable files that have virus 
hidden inside. The spam emails with no attachment usually 
have virus hidden inside of the message body. 
DDoS attack is organized by a hacker who utilizes many 
computers as agents from different locations to launch a 
coordinated attack against one or more targets that consumes 
victim’s network bandwidth, or consumes victim’s resources 
so that legitimate users could not access to the targeted 
computers [2] [3] [4]. Spam email DDoS attacks cause the 
email system damage when it clogs mail server and network 
bandwidth [5]. 
Our research experiment is based on the dataset we 
collected from the email networking system running in the 
Library of the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) 
which contains 4100 spam emails received in five month 
time period of 2009. The email system is running on 
Microsoft Exchange Server. All of these spam email attacks 
come from 450 different sources (IPs). Some of these attacks 
have been identified as DDoS attacks. 
In this project, we propose to use a visual clustering 
method [6][7] for assisting the analysis of email attacks, 
especially the DDoS attacks through the visual 
representation and classification of the spam emails. A clear 
clustered structure of the spam emails could help analysts to 
identify the unusual email events and the types of email 
attacks, including DDoS attacks.   
We first analyze the behaviors of spam emails and then 
create a model for analysis. We use two coefficient vectors: 
‘density’ and ‘weight’ of the spam email attack for analysis. 
We then use a visual clustering method to classify and 
display the spam emails. The visualization allows users to 
interactively select and scale down the scope of views for 
better understanding of different types of the spam email 
attacks for discovering DDoS attacks. The experiment shows 
that this new model with the clustering visualization can be 
effectively used for network security analysis. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Spam email with no attachments 
The first type of spam emails are those with no 
attachments, in which the virus is hidden inside the message 
body and spreads when users open the message. There are 
several situations when a machine receives a spam email of 
this type:  
• If there is a huge number of spam messages and 
unwanted emails are received on a victim email 
system in a short period, they will clog the email 
server, consume the network recourses and 
bandwidth towards a network level DDoS attack that 
will end up the email service in the victim’s 
machine. 
• If the virus has been opened, it will then be 
spreading inside the system and the system will be 
acting as an agent to attack other machines.  
• An opened virus sometimes will kill a few or all 
system processes towards a system crash. 
Message 1 shows the receipt of a no-attachment spam email 
in our email server. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Message 1. Spam email with no attachment 
B. Spam email with attachments 
The second type of spam emails which is a typical spam 
email attack contains attachments that can be larger up to 20 
MB each. There are several situations that could damage the 
system when a machine receives a spam email of this type:  
• If there is a huge number of spam emails with large 
size of attachments arrived at the victim’s system, a 
network level DDoS attack could occur. 
• The executable attachment could bring worms, 
viruses and Trojans into the victim’s system. The 
system could become an agent for spreading attacks 
to other systems when those executed attachments 
send viruses to other machines. 
• When those executable viruses eat local disk spaces, 
memories and kill other applications, an application 
level DDoS attack could occur in the victim’s system 
which will cause services denial to their users.  
 
Message 2 shows the receipt of a spam email with the 
attachment in our email server. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Spam email with attachment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Message 2. Spam email with attachment 
C. Visualization in Network Intrusion Detection 
The most common visualization approach to the problem 
of network intrusion detection is the use of IP Matrix. Koike 
et al. [8] have proposed a 2D IP matrix that is based on the 
32-bits IP addressing space.  This model divides 32-bits IP 
address into two groups: the global-level IP matrix and the 
local-level IP matrix. The global-level IP matrix is the 
highest 8 bits and next high 8 bits make a 2-D IP matrix 
model. The local-level IP matrix is the lower 8 bits × lowest 
8 bits. It has been demonstrated that this IP Matrix 
visualization is effective in visualization and recognition of 
the infection of worms: a type of viruses. By using this IP 
matrix, the propagation of the Welchia worm and the 
Sasser.D worm can be visualized and identified. 
Recently, Zhang et al. [9] further developed a 3D IP 
Matrix visualization called NetViewer that uses the highest 
8-bits IP address as the location. The rest of 24-bits are 
classified into x-axis; y-axis and z-axis for the visual 
representation of the lower 24-bits of IP addresses in a 3D 
space.  NetViewer can be used to detect the DDoS and 
Ports Scan attacks in the networks. 
However, this approach has a number of limitations: 
• Unused IP addresses: in this type of visualization, 
there are many unused IP addresses, and the display 
space is used wastefully. To use display space 
economically, some visualization techniques should 
be applied. However, it is not appropriate to 
eliminate non-existent IP addresses because there 
could be attacks from the spoofed IP addresses. 
• Unable to detect email virus: This method is not 
appropriate to be used for detecting some other types 
of virus which uses different channels for infection. 
For example, in the case of an email virus, the next 
target is selected by using the user’s address book, 
and these addresses have no relation to IP addresses. 
In this case, IP Matrix is not useful for prediction of 
email viruses. 
Another approach which is specifically designed to deal 
with email viruses is called ‘Two-mode visualization’ [10]. 
During the email communication, there are several network 
‘nodes” involved, such as email server, network router and 
switcher. A large amount of information is recorded in the 
log files of these network ‘nodes’ which is hard to be 
represented. However, the Two-mode model has simplified 
those processes by using three stages: 
• Sender sends an email to mail server 
• Email exchanges between servers 
• Receiver receives an email from mail server 
Figure 1 shows the example visualization of the Two-
mode spam email network. The red nodes represent email 
servers, yellow nodes represent clients (sender or receiver), 
green edges represent sending processes, and blue edges 
represent receiving processes. In Figure 1, we can easily see 
that three email servers are receiving a large number of spam 
emails (blue lines) and one email server spread huge viruses 
(green lines) into the network. 
While the Two-mode visualization [10] could help 
analysts to guess email viruses, such as DDoS attacks, 
through the abstract views of the density of green edges (the 
outgoing emails) and blue edges (the incoming emails), it 
does not provide users with any quantified justification of 
particular types of the virus.       
In this paper we will introduce a new analytical model 
that uses two coefficient vectors: ‘density’ and ‘weight’ of 
the spam email attack for DDoS analysis. We then use a 
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visual clustering method to classify and display the spam 
emails. The visualization allows users to interactively select 
and scale down the scope of views for better understanding 
and quantified justification of different types of email virus, 
including DDoS attacks. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Two-mode visualization of spam email network [10]. 
III. CLUSTERED VISUALIZATION 
Graphs which arise in Information Visualization 
applications are typically very large: thousands, or perhaps 
millions of nodes. The graph drawing competitions have 
shown that visualization systems for classical graphs are 
limited to (at best) a few hundred nodes. Attempts to 
overcome this problem have proceeded in two main 
directions: 
Clustering: Groups of related nodes are “clustered" into 
super-nodes. The user sees a summary of the graph: the 
super-nodes and super-edges between the super-nodes. Some 
clusters may be shown in more detail than others. The 
clustering approach has been proposed several times in the 
graph drawing and information visualization conferences [6, 
7], and is related to the overview diagrams" used by some 
web navigation facilities [11]. 
Navigation: The user sees only a small subset of the 
nodes and edges at any one time, and facilities are provided 
to navigate through the graph. This approach was taken by 
the WebOFDAV system [11]. 
A.  The graph level 
In our visualization we use a graph model to represent 
spam emails and their attributes. A graph in our 
visualization is a classical undirected graph, consisting of 
nodes and edges. In our application it is likely a very large 
graph, containing hundreds or thousands of nodes. The 
graph may be dynamic, that is, the node and edge set may 
be changing; these changes may be a result of user 
interaction through the visualization, or they may be 
changed asynchronously by an outside agent. 
B.  The clustering level 
Our visualization uses clusters to represent set of 
groups of spam emails based on variety of similarity rules as 
defined above. The use of clustered visualization will 
significantly reduce a visual complexity of displaying large 
amounts of network related data. A clustered graph C = (G, 
T) consists of an undirected graph G = (V, E) and a rooted 
tree T such that the leaves of T are exactly the vertices of G 
as mentioned in [6]. Figure 2 shows a clustered graph. Our 
clustered visualization can operate on a clustered graph C= 
(G, T) by two basic operations, create and destroy a cluster. 
Both can be performed by user interaction, or by an 
algorithm attached to the visualization. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Multiple Spring-Forces are applied in the clustered 
visualization. 
C. The abridgement level 
The current Intrusion Detection systems lack in display 
focus. They do not consider user orientations and focuses of 
large amounts of data. The use of abridgement level in our 
visualization provides users with a focus+context viewing 
mechanism for navigating the large cluster tree. In many 
cases, the whole clustered graph is too large to show on the 
screen; further, it is too large for the user to comprehend. In 
our implementation, the clustered visualization draws only 
an ``abridgement'' of the entire clustered graph at a time. 
We now give a formal definition of ``abridgement''. 
Suppose that U is a set of nodes of the cluster tree T. The 
sub-tree of T consisting of all nodes and edges on paths 
between elements of U and the root is called the ancestor 
tree of U. A clustered graph C' = (G’, T') is an abridgement 
of the clustered graph C = (G, T) if T' is an ancestor tree of 
T with respect to a set U of nodes of T and there is an edge 
between two distinct nodes u and v of G' if and only if there 
is an edge in G between a descendent of u and a descendent 
of v. Our visualization has two elementary operations on 
abridgements; these change the basis of the abridgement. 
They are open a cluster and close a cluster. 
D. The picture level 
The picture level is concerned with the geometric 
position of the clustered graphs and its associated clustered 
trees as well as visual attributes to be associated to each 
displayed entity. Picture level of a clustered graph is shown 
in Figures 5. More formally, a picture of a clustered graph C 
= (G, T) contains a location p(v) for each vertex v of G and 
a route c(u, v) for each edge (u, v) of G, in the same way as 
drawings for classical graphs. Further, a picture has a region 
b(v) of the plane for each cluster v of T, such that if u is a 
leaf of T then b(v) is located at p(v), and if u is a child of v 
in T then b(u) is contained in b(v). The regions currently 
used by our visualization are rectangles. 
 Our visualization provides the usual operation of 
manually moving nodes in a picture. However, the main role 
of our visualization is animated automatic layout. 
E. The force model 
We use force-directed algorithm to draw the pictures of 
clustered graphs. It is based on the Spring-force model 
described by Eades [12]. Our visualization has three types 
of spring forces: 
• Internal-spring- A spring force between a pair of 
vertices in the same cluster.    
• External-spring- A spring force between a pair of 
vertices in different clusters. 
• Virtual-spring- A spring force between a vertex and 
a virtual (dummy) node along a virtual (dummy) 
edge. 
As well as spring forces, between each pair of nodes 
there is a gravitational repulsion force. The forces are applied 
additively to give an aesthetically pleasing layout of the 
graph. The sum of forces on each node is continually 
computed, and the movement of the nodes according to the 
forces drives the animation, as with the visualization. 
F. Animations 
In our implementation, the whole visualization is fully 
animated. Every transition, whether triggered by the user, 
visualization, or by another agent, has its own specific 
animation. This greatly reduces the cognitive effort of the 
user in recognizing the new view and change; we aim for a 
full preservation of the user's ``mental map''. More 
specifically, there are eight types of animation that are 
implemented in our system. Five of these are specifically 
related to the clustering. 
G. Visual object (entity) design 
We use visual object or entity to represent the spam 
emails for the display and analysis. Currently we use a 
Character String with the syntax below to represent spam 
emails and their attributes: 
 
  [rvt]e[vt]_[att] 
where rvt represents the repeating times of vt type of virus 
received in a time slot p, vt represents a particular type of 
virus, and att represents the attachment type of the virus.  
IV. THE DENSITY + WEIGHT MODEL 
Each spam email is represented as an attributed node in 
the visualization [13] which contains its domain-specific 
attributes, such as receive-time; subject-name; sender-
name; receiver-name; cc-receiver-name; source-IP; virus-
type; attachment-type, etc. Our model selects four most 
relevant attributes for the spam email analysis, which 
include receive-time; virus-type; attachment-type and 
source-IP.  
A spam email that carries a particular type of the virus 
can be defined as an attributed node 
 
  e(t, vt, att, sip) 
 
in which t indicates the arrival time, vt indicate the type of 
virus, att indicates the type of attachment and sip indicates 
source IP address. 
We assume that in a certain time period p of the email 
communication between times tx and ty, a email server 
received a set of n spam emails as defined below 
 
 Ep = (e1, e2, … en)   (1) 
 
and suppose that there are u types of the virus VT = (vt1, vt2, 
…, vtu) that are identified, thus a subset of spam emails 
carrying a particular type of virus vti is defined as 
 
Ep,vt(i)  Ep = { e | e  Ep  e(vt) = vti} (2) 
 
Suppose that there are w different source IP addresses SIP = 
(sip1, sip2, … sipw) that are identified sending spam emails to 
the server during p period, thus a subset of spam emails sent 
from a particular source IP address sipi is defined as 
 
Ep,sip(i)  Ep = { e | e  Ep  e(sip) = sipi} (4) 
 
Accordingly, a subset of spam emails which received from a 
particular source IP address sipi and containing a particular 
type vtj of virus is defined as 
 
Ep,sip(i), vt(j) { e | e  Ep  e(sip) = sipi  e(vt) = vtj}  (5) 
 
Thus, we can determine whether a particular source IP 
sending vtj type of the viruses by the following Boolean 
function 
 (6) 
 
We then can calculate the total number of IPs whose have 
sent vtj  type of viruses to the server during p time slot as 
 
wvt(j) = |SIPvt(j)|  =    (7) 
Suppose that there are v types of attachment (att1, att2, …, 
attv) have been identified, thus a subset of spam emails 
carrying a particular type of attachment atti is defined as 
Ep,att(i)  Ep = { e | e  Ep  e(att) = atti} (8) 
 
Accordingly, the subset of spam emails received from a 
particular source IP address sipi and containing a particular 
type attj of attachment is defined as 
 
Ep,sip(i), att(j) { e | e  Ep  e(sip) = sipi  e(att) = attj}  (9) 
 
Thus, we can determine whether a particular source IP 
sending spam emails with attj type of the attachments by the 
following Boolean function 
 
(10) 
 
We then can calculate the total number of IPs whose have 
sent spam emails with attj type of attachments to the server 
during p time slot as 
 
watt(j) = |SIPatt(j)|  =             (11) 
 
We now introduce two terms: virus density d(vti) for 
measuring the attack pattern of vtj type of virus and 
attachment density d(attj) for measuring the attachment 
pattern of attj type of the attachments in p period. These 
terms are derived from (7) and (11) as shown below  
 
         d(vti)  =                      (12) 
 
        d(attj)  =                         (13) 
 
where,  (0 < d(vti)  < 1) and  (0 < d(attj)  < 1). 
 
If the number of IPs wvt(i) or watt(j) is small, e.g. from a single 
source IP attack, the density value of d(vti) or d(attj) will 
close to zero. For example 
 
        d(vti)  =    ≈ 0 
 
If the number of IPs wvt(i) or watt(j) is large, e.g. the number 
of source IPs is nearly equal to the total number of attacks, 
the density value of d(vti) or d(attj) will close to one, and it 
means that a DDoS attack is most likely occurred. For 
example 
watt(j)  ≈ |Ep|     or     wvt(j) ≈ |Ep| 
 
Suppose that in a time slot p, one type of the virus (or 
attachment) has the highest density and we call it dmax that 
can be expressed as 
 
dmax = max {D(vti), D(attj)} = max {dvt(1), dvt(2), …, dvt(u), 
datt(1), datt(2), …, datt(v)} 
in our detection model, we will consider dmax density as the 
possible attack first in the detection process. 
We would also introduce the term: weight SW(p) to 
measure the system (email server)’s workload in handling 
the attacks in p time period. The system weight is defined 
below 
 
 SW(p) =                 (14) 
where M is the maximum number of incoming emails that 
email server is capable to handle (or transfer) in a short time 
period p in our practices. Our email server which uses the 
Microsoft Exchange, can handle 240 emails (M=240) in 15 
minutes time frame (around 16 emails per minute). 
With light weight spam email attacks, they cost less 
than 20% of the system capability to handle or transfer these 
spam emails. Thus, it can be defined as a light weight attack 
if the system workload is between 0 ≤ SW(p) < 0.2.  
Accordingly, we can define a medium level spam email 
attack if the system workload (or weight) is between 0.2 ≤ 
SW(p) < 0.7 in handling this attack, and a high level email 
attack if the system workload (or weight) is between 0.7 ≤ 
SW(p) < 1.0 in handling that attack. 
If the system weight is great than one 1.0 < SW(p), 
then we consider that there is a critical level of spam email 
attack has occurred.  
We can further define a scalability vector 
AttackScale(p) for the measurement of DDoS attack. It 
combines two vectors: the maximum virus density dmax and 
the system weight SW(p) together. We have 
  
 AttackScale(p) = dmax × SW(p)              (15) 
 
  
The vector AttackScale(p) indicates the scale of the 
most active type of spam emails (with attachment or with no 
attachment) that are current attacking the email server.  
The outcome of our experiments showed that if 
AttackScale(p)<0.2 and dmax≈ 1, then a small scale DDoS 
attack is occurred. If 0.2<AttackScale(p)<0.7 and dmax≈1, 
then a medium scale DDoS attack is occurred. If 
0.7<AttackScale(p)<1.0 and dmax≈ 1, then it is most likely 
that a large scale DDoS attack is occurred.  If 1.0≤ 
AttackScale(p), then a critical level DDoS attack is occurred 
and the email server could be down.  
V. EXAMPLE: SPAM EMAIL VISUALIZATION 
This section contains a sequence of screen dumps from 
Figure 3 to Figure 7 collected from our visualization system. 
They illustrate the visual analysis process for detecting 
DDoD attacks. These screens will show you how they 
achieve a better quality of the layout of clustered spam 
emails through the smooth transaction of views. 
VI. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION  
This paper introduces the application of clustered data 
visualization for spam email analysis. We use a new 
analytical model called density+weight model that uses two 
coefficient vectors: ‘density’ and ‘weight’ for the virus and 
DDoS analysis. The visualization allows users to 
interactively select and scale down the scope of views for 
better understanding of different types of the spam email 
virus and attacks. The experiment shows that this new 
model with the clustering visualization can be used 
effectively for network security analysis. 
Currently we use character string to represent the 
attributes of spam emails in the visualization. In the future, 
we will use a set of graphical nodes with rich graphic 
properties to represent spam emails. We will attempt to map 
the graphic properties to the email domain-specific 
attributes. For example, we will use different shapes, colors, 
sizes and brightness to represent the domain-specific 
attributes of emails, such as different types of viruses, types 
of attachments, and source IP addresses. Under this scheme, 
the user can gain the knowledge of classification of different 
spam emails through the visual interpretation.   
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Figure 3.  A clustered visualization of a spam email graph C=(G, T), where G=(V, E) and E= . Seven clusters are created in C based on the virus types 
received in a time slot p. However, this layout has many overlaps among clusters. 
 Figure 4.   The same layout as shown in Figure 3; however, the virtual nodes (red nodes) and edges are added. Each virtual node appears as the center point 
of a cluster linking with all the nodes in a particular cluster. 
 
Figure 5.  After applying the ‘virtual spring’ forces along the red (virtual) edges, the overlaps among clusters are eliminated. We now can have a clear view 
of the clustering structure.   
 Figure 6.  From Figure 5, we can quickly identify that dmax= dvt(5), that is the 5th virus has the highest density with 31 repeating rate and 22 of them occurred 
within 7 minutes of p. To be able to see the detail of ‘Cluster 5’ we close other six clusters through the ‘close’ operation in the abridgement level of the 
clustering. After an inspection into the detail of vt5, we found that all emails containing vt5 are coming from different source IPs. Thus, density of this virus is 
dvt(5) =1. However, the weight of the email system is SW(p) =0.20 and the attack scalability is AttackScale =0.20. Finally, we confirmed our detection 
outcome: a small scale DDoS attack occurred in our email server. 
 
Figure 7. The same layout and visualization as shown in Figure 6; however, the virtual nodes (red nodes) and edges are disappeared.  
